

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 AF-08 ARA-06 CIAE-00 EA-07 EUR-12 PM-04

H-01 INR-07 IO-13 L-03 NASA-01 NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05

OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01 PRS-01 OES-06 SS-15 USIA-06 /121 W

-----161627Z 061592 /42

R 161410Z MAR 77

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5964

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PARM, CCD

SUBJECT: CCD: SECOND INFORMAL MEETING WITH EXPERTS ON NEW MASS

DESTRUCTION WEAPONS (MDW), MARCH 15, 1977

1. SUMMARY: AT SECOND INFORMAL MEETING ON MDW SWEDISH

EXPERT DISCUSSED DEFINITIONS, NEED TO AVOID IMPACTING

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ON TREATIES IN EXISTENCE AND UNDER NEGOTIATION, AND

FREEDOM OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH. CZECH EXPERT SPOKE ABOUT

DEFINITIONS AND STATED THAT GENETIC ENGINEERING HAS BEEN

COVERED BY BW CONVENTION. FRG REP NOTED THAT FRG HAD

RENOUNCED ABC WEAPONS AND HAD NO INTENTION OF SEEKING NEW

MDW. FRG EXPERT DISCUSSED PROBLEM OF DEFINITION AND

VERIFICATION REGARDING NEW MDW AND NEED TO AVOID EXPOSING

TO DOUBT TREATIES IN EXISTENCE OR UNDER ACTIVE NEGOTIATION. CANADIAN EXPERT THOUGHT AD HOC APPROACH NEEDED TO DEFINE SPECIFIC WEAPONS COVERED BY NEW MDW. NETHERLANDS EXPERT EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT NEW MDW CAN BE DEALT WITH IN A SINGLE CONVENTION. NETHERLANDS EXPERT REITERATED VIEWS EXPRESSED LAST SUMMER THAT ACOUSTIC AND ELECTROMAGNETIC WAVE PHENOMENA COULD NOT PRACTICALLY SERVE AS MDW. PAKISTANI REP SUPPORTED THE THESIS THAT FORMAL AGREEMENT DEALING WITH NEW MDW NECESSARY. INDIAN REP SAID SOVIET PROPOSAL SHOULD RECEIVE STRONG SUPPORT. END SUMMARY.

2. SECOND INFORMAL MEETING OF CCD WITH EXPERTS ON NEW MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS (MDW) WAS HELD ON MARCH 15 WITH ROMANIAN REP (ENE) IN CHAIR. SWEDISH REP (HAMILTON) SAID IN REFERENCE TO SOVIET MEMO CCD/552 THAT THOUGH IT MAY BE DESIRABLE TO ADDRESS ISSUE OF NEW MDW, IT WAS TOO EARLY TO SPEAK OF NEGOTIATIONS SINCE A FULL UNDERSTANDING OF ISSUES WAS LACKING. SWEDISH EXPERT (LUNDIN) SAID HE WOULD NOT GO SO FAR AS TO SAY IMPOSSIBLE TO DEFINE NEW MDW. HE NOTED THAT INDIAN REP HAD SHOWN DEFINITIONS OF WEAPONS ARRIVED AT ON AD HOC BASIS OF THE WEAPONS DEVELOPED. ONE ELEMENT OF DEFINITION WAS CONTAINED IN UN RESOLUTION OF 1948: MASS DESTRUCTION COMPARABLE TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HOWEVER, IT WAS NOT CLEAR THAT FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS WOULD BE COMPARABLE TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THEREFORE, ONE NEEDED TO ASSUME THAT A NEW MDW WOULD INVOLVE COMPARABLE AMOUNTS OF ACTIVE MATERIAL TO THAT OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL OR CHEMICAL WEAPONS. HE NOTED SOVIET AND POLISH EXPERTS REFERENCE TO USE OF NON-IONIZING RADIATION WHERE SMALL AMOUNTS OF ENERGY COULD DESTROY LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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FUNCTIONING OF TARGET. THIS HE SAID WAS ANOTHER ASPECT, BUT FURTHER NOTED THAT PROTECTION COULD BE EASILY DERIVED BY SCREENING. CHARACTERISTIC OF SUCH WEAPONS SHOULD BE LOOKED

AT TO RECONCILE DIFFERENCES WITH USUAL MDW.

3. WITH REFERENCE TO WORD "NEW" MDW, SWEDISH EXPERT SAID IT WAS OBVIOUS TO CONSIDER THAT NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS WERE TAKEN CARE OF BY EXISTING TREATIES AND ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER, IT WAS PERHAPS POSSIBLE THAT NEW PHYSICAL EFFECTS COULD BE INVOKED, BUT IT WAS OPEN QUESTION WHETHER THE EFFECTS WOULD BE COMPARABLE TO ACCEPTED NOTION OF MDW.

4. WITH RESPECT TO THE TARGETS OF MDW REFERRED TO IN CCD/514 CLASSIFICATION "THE SPECTRUM OF TARGETS WAS SO WIDE AS TO IMPLY WAR WAS PROHIBITED." HOWEVER DESIRABLE, SUCH A PROHIBITION COULD NOT BE REACHED BY A DEFINITION.

5. SWEDISH EXPERT NEXT DEALT WITH "DILEMMA" THAT SCIENTIFIC

DEVELOPMENTS COULD BE BENEVOLENT AS WELL AS LEAD TO NEW WEAPONRY,  
AND ASKED RHETORICALLY WHETHER SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH SHOULD BE  
STOPPED BECAUSE OF POTENTIAL APPLICATION TO WEAPONRY. HE SAID  
IT COULD BE REQUIRED THAT SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH BE OPEN  
TO ALL COUNTRIES. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSALS  
COULD GAIN BY REQUIRING PERIODIC REVIEW OF SCIENTIFIC  
DEVELOPMENTS SO THAT PROHIBITION OF NEW MDW COULD BE DONE  
AT EARLY STAGE AND THAT THE CCD COULD PERHAPS CONDUCT SUCH  
REVIEWS.

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6. CZECH EXPERT (DR. FRANEK) NOTED THAT SOME REPRESENT-  
ATIVES HAD OBJECTED TO DISCUSSION OF GENETIC ENGINEERING IN  
THE CONTEXT OF NEW MDW. HIS GOVERNMENT BELIEVED STATEMENTS

THAT SUCH DEVELOPMENTS ARE INCLUDED IN BW TREATY. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT GENETIC INFORMATION COULD BE USED TO CONSTRUCT "ETHNIC WEAPONS" USING CW AGAINST CERTAIN SUSCEPTIBILITIES OF PARTICULAR ETHNIC GROUPS. HE PRAISED UK EXPERT STATEMENT, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO QUESTION OF DEFINITION AND FREE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE. HE THOUGHT THAT A GOOD DEFINITION WOULD INDEED MAKE WORK SIMPLER, BUT IMPORTANCE OF DEFINITION SHOULD NOT BE OVERESTIMATED. PROGRESS IN SCIENCE AND ALSO ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS HAD BEEN POSSIBLE WITH LESS THAN PERFECT DEFINITIONS. HE THEN AGREED THAT PROHIBITION OF NEW MDW WOULD NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT FREEDOM OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH. HE SAID "WE AGREE THAT GENETIC ENGINEERING HAS BEEN COVERED BY BW TREATY."

7. FRG REP (SCHLAICH) NOTED FRG HAD RENOUNCED ABC WEAPONS WHEN IT CAME INTO BEING AND WAS READY TO PARTICIPATE IN NEGOTIATIONS TO PREVENT PRODUCTION AND USE OF NEW MDW.

HOWEVER, HE SAID FRG REMAINS SKEPTICAL OF SOVIET INITIATIVE FOR FOLLOWING REASONS: A) THERE IS NO REASON TO REPLACE 1948 UN DEFINITION WHICH HAS INTERNATIONAL VALIDITY; B) NEW DEFINITION COULD LEAD TO SITUATION WHERE EXISTING TREATIES BECOME INSUFFICIENT; C) DEFINITIONS IN SOVIET INITIATIVE PRESENTED DANGER OF INTERFERENCE WITH SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH.

8. FRG EXPERT (FEIGL) DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITIONS AND VERIFICATION, AND STRESSED THAT "TREATIES IN EXISTENCE OR UNDER ACTIVE NEGOTIATION MUST NOT BE EXPOSED TO DOUBT."

9. CANADIAN REP (JAY) SAID THAT CANADA HAD VOTED IN FAVOR OF RES ON NEW MDW AT THE UNGA LAST FALL, BUT HAD NO PRE-CONCEIVED NOTIONS. HE ADDED THAT SUBJECT SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED TO SEE WHAT CONCEPT OF PROHIBITION OF NEW MDW INVOLVES. CANADIAN EXPERT (KOOP) WELCOMED SOVIET INITIATIVE AND HOPED FOR ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT. A GENERAL CONCERN WAS THAT DISCUSSION ON ANY AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT CHALLENGE EXISTING AGREEMENTS OR THOSE UNDER NEGOTIATION OR DIVERT ATTENTION FROM MORE IMMEDIATE TASKS.

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10. CANADIAN EXPERT VIEWED DIRECTION OF MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS, AS DID UK EXPERT, AS MOVING TOWARD WEAPONS OF LESS

DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL, WHICH MAY POSE PROBLEM FOR ARMS CONTROL, BUT NOT AS MDW. HE SAW NEED FOR DEFINITION OF MDW, BUT SAW NO WAY TO ACHIEVE IT, THEREFORE AN AD HOC APPROACH WOULD BE NEEDED, AND HE ENDORSED UK SUGGESTION

FOR MECHANISM TO REVIEW POTENTIAL OF NEW TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS FOR MDW. HE DID NOT SEE APPLICATION OF ACOUSTIC AND ELECTROMAGNETIC WAVES TO MDW. WITH RESPECT TO LASERS, HE NOTED THEY MIGHT HAVE LEGITIMATE DEFENSE POTENTIAL AND SHOULD NOT BE BROUGHT INTO DISCUSSION. HE DISPENSED WITH IDEA OF USING CALIFORNIUM FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, SAYING SUCH WEAPONS EVEN IF DEVELOPED, WOULD HAVE VERY LOW YIELD.

10. NETHERLANDS ALTERNATE REP (MEERBURG) EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT BAN ON MDW COULD BE DONE IN SINGLE CONVENTION. EACH WEAPON NEEDS SPECIAL TREATMENT, AS FOR EXAMPLE WITH RESPECT TO VERIFICATION HE ALSO EXPRESSED VIEW THAT ANY SUCH AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT AFFECT EXISTING AGREEMENTS. NETHERLANDS EXPERT (VAN BATENBURG) AGAIN EXPRESSED VIEW MADE LAST SUMMER THAT ACOUSTIC AND ELECTROMAGNETIC WAVE PHENOMENA COULD NOT PRACTICALLY SERVE AS MDW. SUCH WEAPONS WOULD BE VERY EXPENSIVE, INEFFICIENT AND INFERIOR TO EXISTING WEAPONS.

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11. PAKISTANI REP (YUNUS) SAID THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF DESIRABILITY OF BAN ON MDW. HE THEN MADE FOUR POINTS WITH RESPECT TO SUCH A BAN: (A) IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT BAN WOULD NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH; (B) IT SHOULD NOT DILUTE EXISTING CONVENTIONS OR THOSE BEING NEGOTIATED; (C) IT WOULD NOT DIVERT ATTENTION FROM EXISTING MDW; AND (D) IT WAS REASONABLE TO TRY AND STOP DEVELOPMENT OF NEW MDW.  
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THE FACT THEY DID NOT EXIST WAS NOT A WEAKNESS OF THE PROPOSAL BUT THE STRENGTH OF IT.

12. PAKISTANI REP SAID THAT FACTORS SUCH AN AGREEMENT SHOULD HAVE WERE (A) BAN DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION OF NEW MDW; (B) AN AGREED LIST OF POSSIBILITIES TO BE BANNED; WITHOUT AGREED LIST, CONVENTION WOULD BE POINTLESS; (C) LIST SHOULD BE REVIEWED PERIODICALLY AT EXPERT LEVEL; AND (D) REVIEW OF CONVENTION AT POLITICAL LEVEL IF JUSTIFIED BY EXPERTS' REVIEW. A DEFINITION SHOULD BE AVOIDED, SINCE IT COULD ONLY BE REACHED AFTER A WEAPONS AGREEMENT EXISTED. THE LIST WOULD IN EFFECT SERVE AS DEFINITION. THE AGREEMENT MUST BE CONSTRUCTED SO AS IT COULD EVOLVE TO HANDLE FUTURE.

13. INDIAN REP (JAIN) BEGAN BY TELLING TWO ANECDOTES WHICH HE RELATED TO QUESTION OF FOREIGN MILITARY BASES (COMMENT: THIS PROBABLY INDICATES HIS INSTRUCTION TO MAKE STATEMENT AT EARLY OPPORTUNITY ON INDIAN OCEAN ZONE OF PEACE, INCLUDING FOREIGN BASE ISSUE.) TURNING TO MDW HE SAW TWO PROBLEMS: OF DEFINITION AND VERIFICATION. WITH RESPECT TO THAT OF DEFINITION, HE NOTED OTHER TREATIES HAD NOT FOUND IT NECESSARY TO DEAL WITH QUESTIONS CITING SEA-BED TREATY, BW TREATY AND MPT. THERE WAS NO NEED TO DEAL WITH QUESTION IN THIS CONTEXT AND HE NOTED SOVIET EXPERT HAD IDENTIFIED FIVE AREAS OF MDW. WITH RESPECT TO VERIFICATION OR CONTROL, HE STRESSED THAT THESE GO TOGETHER WITH DISARMAMENT. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, HE SAID, SHOULD HAVE STRONG SUPPORT BECAUSE IT WAS PREVENTIVE, IN LINE WITH HIGHEST PRIORITIES AND WAS CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE. HE REFERRED TO CLAIM THAT PROPOSAL COULD DIVERT ATTENTION FROM OTHER WORK. HOWEVER, IT WAS NOT A

DIVERSION TO DEAL WITH MDW. IT WAS A DIVERSION HOWEVER,  
HE CLAIMED TO SUGGEST THAT "LEVELS OF NATIONAL SECURITY  
SHOULD BE DETERMINED", (COMMENT: I.E. IMPLICITLY BY CONTROLLING  
CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS).

14. NEXT INFORMAL MEETING ON NEW MDW WAS SCHEDULED FOR  
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AFTERNOON MARCH 16. SORENSON

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## Message Attributes

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**TAGS:** PARM, CCD  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/7cf080b7-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
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